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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to examine the eﬀect of poison pills on
shareholder wealth using cases of Japanese ﬁrms that announced the
adoption of poison pills between April 2005 and May 2006. We ﬁnd
that announcements of poison pill defenses reduce shareholder wealth
by a signiﬁcant amount. We also investigate the relationship between
this negative stock price response to poison pills and a manager’s
incentive for entrenchment, using conditional event study methods.
We conﬁrm that the probability of adopting poison pills is higher if
CEOs have longer tenure or smaller shareholdings. In such cases, we
ﬁnd that the stock price responds negatively when the performance of
the ﬁrm is poor because pill adoptions deliver a signal that reveals to
investors the manager’s tendency toward entrenchment.
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 1 Introduction
The ﬁrst poison pill in Japan was in 2005, reﬂecting the resurgence of merger
and acquisition(M&A) activity since the end of the 1990s. How in fact do
poison pills aﬀect ﬁrms that adopt them in Japan? Most of the previous
empirical studies using U.S. data have investigated two theoretical hypothe-
ses about the eﬀects of poison pills on shareholder value: managerial en-
trenchment and shareholder value. The managerial entrenchment hypothesis
predicts that poison pill adoptions make it less likely that shareholders will
receive takeover premiums, and announcements of poison pills result in stock
price declines. For example, Bebchuck, Coates and Subramanian (2002) ar-
gue that a poison pill provides a powerful takeover deterrent particularly
when it is combined with a staggered board.
On the other hand, the shareholder interest hypothesis predicts that the
adoption of poison pills should be accompanied by stock price increases,
because the pill is adopted primarily to protect shareholders from receiving
less than full value for their holdings in control transactions. Comment and
Schwert (1995) and Heron and Lie (2006) ﬁnd that pills increase takeover
premiums without decreasing the likelihood of takeover.
These discussions presuppose that a poison pill has a real eﬀect on the
bargaining power of the target ﬁrm’s managers. However, in Japan, it is not
clear whether the poison pill has a real eﬀect on shareholder value because
there are almost no cases in which a ﬁrm with a poison pill became the
target of a hostile takeover. Therefore, we cannot conclude whether a poison
pill in Japan provides bargaining power to the target ﬁrm to obtain a higher
premium, or that it defeats the value-increasing changes of control and allows
managers to entrench themselves.
This ambiguous situation in Japan gives us an opportunity to test the
1alternative hypothesis that adoption of a poison pill reveals the private in-
formation of managers. Coates (2000) and Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003)
state that in the U.S., managers can adopt a pill at any time and the ac-
tual presence of the pill is irrelevant until the ﬁrm becomes a takeover tar-
get. Therefore, the stock market response to announcement of the poison
pill adoption does not represent the subsequent future decline or increase of
shareholder value. Rather, they show the stock market response to the rev-
elation of private information about managerial preference for shareholder
value revealed by the adoption of the poison pill.
Because the real eﬀectiveness of poison pills has never been observed
among market participants in Japan, the hypothesis in this paper is that any
stock market variations in response to the announcement of the poison pill
mean the response to the revelation of private information about the man-
ager’s preferences toward the takeover. We call this the private information
revelation hypothesis. In this hypothesis, managers reveal their true prefer-
ence about shareholder value through their behavior in adopting the poison
pill.
To examine the private information revelation hypothesis, we use condi-
tional event-study methods based on Acharya (1988). Acharya introduced
the self-selection model to event studies, using the Heckman speciﬁcation to
model calls for convertible bonds. In Acharya’s model, a ﬁrm ﬁrst decides
whether to call an outstanding convertible bond based on the observable
variables and private information. Acharya shows that the coeﬃcient of the
inverse Mills ratio of the Heckman model, which shows the eﬀect of the
private information on the stock market price, is signiﬁcant if the private
information aﬀects the stock price.
In this paper, we use variables relating to the degree of the “dictatorship”
2of the manager as the preannouncement information that is assumed to aﬀect
the decision to adopt a poison pill. We ﬁrst examine whether the manager
with a higher degree of dictatorship tends to adopt a poison pill or not.
Then, based on the ﬁrst round regression, we investigate the link between
the private information about the manager’s preference and the stock price
response.
We ﬁnd that ﬁrms that are under threat of a takeover bid (TOB) and
have a manager with longer tenure tend to adopt poison pills. We further
ﬁnd that only when the ﬁrm is performing poorly does the powerful manager
tend to adopt a poison pill. Because a manager who is in that position for
a longer period tends to have more power to make independent decisions, a
powerful manager or dictator is more likely to adopt a poison pill.
Based on these results, we examine the relationship between market re-
sponses measured by the cumulative two-day abnormal return (CAR) and the
behavior of adopting poison pills. Then, we ﬁnd that the stock price signiﬁ-
cantly decreases with the private information revealed by the announcement
of the poison pill, especially when the ﬁrm is performing poorly, and the
stock price does not respond to the news when the better performing ﬁrm
adopts a poison pill. Considering the fact that the pill is adopted by man-
agers with longer tenure, we conclude that investors are surprised by the
news about poison pills, and respond negatively only to the announcement
by ﬁrms with bad corporate governance and poor corporate performance, be-
cause this conﬁrms that the manager really does not care about shareholder
interests.
The results in this paper relate to the recent debate about corporate gov-
ernance and stock price returns. Gompers et al. (2003) and Cremers and Nair
(2005) ﬁnd that governance can directly inﬂuence equity price. In particular,
3Gompers et al. argue that in the early 1990s, investors might not have fully
appreciated the agency costs engendered by weak governance. Subsequent to
the realization of the agency costs, investors lower their expectations about
poorly governed ﬁrms’ future cash ﬂows, which results in stock price declines.
The ﬁndings in this paper contribute to this debate. The results sug-
gest that an investor does not fully anticipate the agency costs by simply
observing formal information such as the CEO’s tenure, shareholder struc-
ture, or board members’ independence. A decision by the manager to adopt
a poison pill conveys private information about the manager’s preferences
regarding shareholder value, and the investors can adjust their expectations
about agency costs, which decrease the stock price.
The paper proceeds as follows. We begin in Section 2 by describing our
hypothesis and methodology. Sections 3 and 4 explain our data. Section
5 ﬁrst examines the factors that aﬀect the decision to adopt a poison pill
using a probit model. Then, we investigate the private information revelation
hypothesis using the conditional event study method. We conclude in Section
6.
2 Hypotheses and Methodology
In this section, we develop a hypothesis about the eﬀect of a poison pill on
the stock price. Then, we describe the methodology used to examine this
hypothesis.
2.1 Hypotheses
Comment and Schwert (1995) summarized the theoretical framework that
underlies event studies of poison pills, noting that the wealth eﬀect of pill
adoption is the combination of the following three factors: (1) a stock price
4decline because of the deterrence of future takeovers—the managerial en-
trenchment hypothesis, (2) the expected present value of any increase in
premiums due to a gain in bargaining power—the shareholder interest hy-
pothesis, and (3) a revelation of management’s private information—the pri-
vate information revelation hypothesis. Most of the research into the wealth
eﬀect of poison pills using event study methodology in the U.S. compares the
managerial and shareholder-interest hypotheses.1
The managerial entrenchment hypothesis emphasizes conﬂicts of interest
when a takeover reduces a manager’s private beneﬁt. In these circumstances,
managers use pill defenses to protect their positions and prevent value that
would be increased by change of control. The managerial entrenchment hy-
pothesis predicts that poison pill adoptions make it less likely that share-
holders will receive takeover premiums, and announcement of poison pills
results in stock price declines. The hypothesis further predicts that declines
are larger when there is a high probability of the ﬁrms being taken over.
The shareholder interest hypothesis predicts that the adoption of poison
pills should be accompanied by stock price increases. Under this hypothe-
sis, the pill is adopted primarily to protect shareholders from receiving less
than full value for their holdings in control transactions, and this adoption
gives incumbent managers more bargaining power in negotiations about the
premium.
These two ideas presuppose that the adoption of poison pills has a real
deterrent eﬀect against the takeover. However, it is not certain that poison
pills really deter takeovers, even in the case of the U.S. as Coates (2000)
persuasively argued. Coates insists that all ﬁrms in the U.S. have a shadow
pill, and even after a hostile bid, a manager can easily adopt a poison pill
1 Coates (2000) surveys the empirical research on the wealth eﬀect of poison pills in
the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S.
5to block the oﬀer at least temporarily. This means the announcement of the
adoption of a poison pill in itself has no signiﬁcant eﬀect. The wealth eﬀect
of the poison pill can be interpreted only from the viewpoint of the signaling
eﬀect of managers. In Japanese cases, it is also unclear whether a poison pill
has a real deterrent eﬀect or not, since there have been almost no cases in
which a ﬁrm with a poison pill became the target of a hostile takeover.
In this situation, the only eﬀect that can certainly be expected on the
short-term stock price following the announcement of the adoption of a poi-
son pill is not the real deterrent eﬀect of a hostile takeover, but rather the
revelation of the management’s private information. Then, based on the man-
agement private information revelation hypotheses, the wealth eﬀect depends
on investors’ beliefs about the managers of the ﬁrm. Prior to pill adoption,
investors form some belief about the managers’ preferences regarding share-
holder value. Pill adoption for a given ﬁrm sends positive or negative signals
depending on these beliefs. Because the adoption of a poison pill suggests
that managers are more likely to resist a bid should one emerge in the fu-
ture, the point is whether this resistance leads to higher bargaining power
for the future bid and a higher premium, or if it simply allows the incumbent
managers to indulge in empire-building activity even though the company’s
performance is poor.
2.2 Methodology
To investigate the hypothesis discussed above, we ﬁrst specify a statistical
model of a ﬁrm’s decision to announce the introduction of a poison pill, based
on Nayak and Prabhala (2001) and Li and Prabhala (2007). Suppose that
ﬁrm i announces the introduction of a poison pill if variable POIi is positive,
where POIi is interpreted as the net beneﬁt from the announcement. Part of
6POIi is publicly known, based on observable variables Xi. Ãi represents ﬁrm
i’s private information motivating the introduction of a poison pill. Here we
focus on the manager’s concern for shareholder value as private information.
Thus ﬁrm i announces the introduction of a poison pill if
POIi = µpXi + Ãi > 0 (1)
where E(Ãi), the preannouncement expectation of private information,
Ãi, is zero without loss of generality.
The announcement of the introduction of a poison pill reveals the an-
nouncing ﬁrm’s private information about the degree of the manager’s share-
holder orientation, Ãi, to the market. Based on this fact, markets can update
the expectations about the ﬁrm’s private information Ãi. The revised expec-
tation of Ãi, conditional on the introduction of the poison pill, forms the
information revealed by the introduction of the poison pill. If the poison pill
has negative (or positive) valuation eﬀects, we should ﬁnd that poison pill
announcement eﬀects are negatively (or positively) related to the informa-
tion revealed in the poison pill. Thus, ¯p should be negative (or positive) in
the following regression:
E(ARi j P) = °p + ¯pE(Ãi j µpXi + Ãi > 0) (2)
where ARi denotes the eﬀect associated with the announcement of a
poison pill, P, by ﬁrm i. Equation (2) gives the conditional eﬀect associated
with an announcement of a poison pill, given the vector of characteristics
Xi associated with the ﬁrm adopting the pill. Uppercase P denotes the
introduction of a poison pill, while lowercase p denotes parameters used in
modeling the introduction of a poison pill.
73 Data
3.1 Sample data of ﬁrms adopting poison pills
Our sample consists of 171 cases wherein ﬁrms announced the intention to
adopt poison pills between April 2005 and May 2006. Of these 171 cases, 18
are rollovers in which a company adopting a poison pill that expired within
one year in 2005 was extended for another year in 2006. Therefore, the
number of ﬁrms with pill defenses in our sample was 153.2 This information
was obtained from Bloomberg News and primary source documents through
correspondence. We began collecting the data from April 2005 because the
ﬁrst case of poison pill adoption in Japan occurred at that time. In 2005, 27
companies adopted the measure, and in 2006 the number of companies that
adopted poison pills increased to 144 including rollovers from previous years
in our sample period.
There are two main types of poison pill in Japan: prior warning and rights
plan. The prior warning type is a rule that must be followed by a party
pursuing the takeover, and breach of the rule by the acquirers leads to the
actual measures, such as the issuance of new stock reservation rights. Thus,
at the time of its announcement, it does not involve the actual measure. The
second is the rights plan type, which involves the actual issuance of new stock
reservation rights and is deemed to be a more aggressive measure. These
rights are issued in advance to trust banks or special purpose corporations,
and if a takeover event occurs they will be allocated to the shareholders. In
Table 1, we ﬁnd that most ﬁrms have adopted the prior warning type (158
cases, or 92% of the total), and only 14 ﬁrms (8% of the total) the rights
plan type.
2Firms with poison pills account for about 5% of all listed ﬁrms in Japan.
8As Table 1 also shows, in 96 cases out of 171 (56%) the ﬁrm obtained
approval to adopt the poison pill at a general meeting of shareholders. While
only 33% (nine out of 27 cases) obtained shareholder approval in 2005, the
percentage increased to 60% (87 cases out of 144) in 2006.
===Table 1 =====
Some characteristics of ﬁrms with poison pills are shown in Tables 2–4.
Financial data used here were obtained from Bloomberg and QUICK AM-
SUS, and the data about board members from Toyo-Keizai’s Yakuin Shikiho
(Japanese company board handbook). Table 2 shows the market capitaliza-
tion of the 153 companies that adopted pills. The average market capital-
ization of the sample ﬁrms was 290 billion yen, whereas that of the average
listed ﬁrms was 145 billion yen.3 The diﬀerence in market capitalization
between sample ﬁrms and the average for listed ﬁrms is statistically signif-
icant at the 5% level. This diﬀerence can be attributed to the level of cost
tolerance toward introducing takeover measures. Within sample ﬁrms, the
average market capitalization of ﬁrms that adopted poison pills in 2005 was
420 billion yen, and that of ﬁrms that adopted pills in 2006 was 262 billion
yen.
===Table 2 =====
Table 3 compares the price-to-book ratio (PBR) for the sample and listed
ﬁrms.4 The mean PBR of the sample ﬁrm is 1.785 and that for all listed ﬁrms
3The listed ﬁrms consisted of all Japanese ﬁrms excluding REITs and investment funds
listed on any of the Japanese equity markets. The market capitalization data are as of the
end of May 2006.
4PBR data are as of the end of May 2006, and 21 ﬁrms were excluded because they
did not have proper BPS data following mergers, etc.
9is 2.258. This suggests that low-valued ﬁrms introduce poison pills as an
antitakeover measure, although the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant.
The lower the valuation of a ﬁrm, the greater the potential risk of being
taken over by a hostile company or funds, and this may be one reason to use
poison pills as an antitakeover measure.
===Table 3 =====
Table 4 shows the industry distribution of ﬁrms with poison pills. The
highest number of ﬁrms adopting pills are in the information and commu-
nication sector; 16 ﬁrms or 10.5% of all the sample ﬁrms adopted poison
pills. This sector is regarded as an active M&A sector in Japan, and it is
among the top ﬁve M&A sectors in terms of the number of deals from 2001 to
2006. The chemical and steel sectors also show a relatively high percentage of
ﬁrms adopting pills relative to the overall Japanese equity market. Because
the economies of scale are relatively large and global reorganization through
M&As is occurring in these sectors, managers may see a greater necessity for
antitakeover measures.
===Table 4 =====
3.2 Unconditional announcement eﬀects of poison pill
To evaluate the wealth eﬀect of poison pills in Japan based on the private
information hypothesis, we ﬁrst computed the one- and two-day abnormal
stock returns after the announcements of poison pills. We used the standard
market model with TOPIX as a market index. To estimate ♁ and ♂, we
used daily returns over a period of 270 days prior to the announcement and
10ending 21 days before the announcement. This led to (3), where AR is
the one-day abnormal return and CAR is the cumulative two-day abnormal
return.
ARit = Rit ¡ [®it + ¯Rmt];CARit = ARit + ARit+1 (3)
Table 6 summarizes the results. When we use the entire sample for the
regression of the market model, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant evidence for the wealth
eﬀect of poison pills. The average CAR is -0.22% and the median is -0.24%,
but both are insigniﬁcant.
It should, however, be noted that most ﬁrms simultaneously announce
the adoption of pills with other news, especially about earnings results and
earnings forecasts. In our sample, 118 cases out of 171 announced some
news that might aﬀect the stock price, and most of the news was about
earnings results and earnings forecasts. In fact, in 101 cases in our sample
the adoption of pills was simultaneously announced with earnings results
news.5 To control for these eﬀects, we calculated the growth rate of proﬁt
for the previous ﬁscal year (PG) and the forecasted growth rate of the proﬁt
for the ﬁscal year of the announcement (FG). We also created a dummy
variable, POSN, equaling one if a ﬁrm announced some other positive news
for its stock price. In our sample, 11 positive news announcements, such as
dividend increases, were observed.6 Table 5 summarizes the data on news
associated with the adoption of pills.
===Table 5 =====
To exclude the eﬀects of these confounding events on the stock price, we
5In Japan, companies announce their ﬁscal year forecasts for the following year along
with the results of the previous ﬁscal year.
6Furthermore, six cases out of 171 announced news about earnings revision.
11calculated the excess returns for cases free of confounding events (a clean
sample) in Table 6. Then, we found that both the one-day abnormal return
(AR) and the average CAR are negative at the 5% signiﬁcance level. For
51 clean sample cases, the average AR was –0.80% with a t-statistic of –
2.29, which is statistically signiﬁcant. For 52 cases, the average CAR is
–1.50% with a t-statistic of –2.50, which is statistically signiﬁcant. These
negative eﬀects suggest that the stock market negatively responded to the
announcement of a poison pill regardless of the reason each ﬁrm adopted it.
===Table 6 =====
3.3 Governance characteristics of sample ﬁrms
The empirical test for the conditional event study requires us to specify a set
of variables X that determines the market’s expectations about forthcoming
introductions of poison pills. Because we focus on the managerial private
information revelation hypothesis, we mainly construct variables related to
corporate governance structures for managers.
Because the adoption of poison pills is basically determined by a corporate
board, the CEO’s inﬂuence on that decision-making process is one of the most
important factors for the corporate governance structure to consider. Then,
as a proxy for the degree of dictatorship of the manager in the boardroom, we
used the tenure of the CEO, deﬁned here as the length of time the CEO has
been a board member. We anticipate that the longer the tenure of the CEO,
the more the CEO obtains political power to entrench him/herself. In fact,
Bebchuck, Grinstein and Peyer (2006) show that fortuitous grants of stock
options were more likely to occur when the CEO had longer tenure, and
insisted on the importance of the CEO’s tenure for corporate governance.
Furthermore, as a proxy for the degree of alignment of interest between
12a CEO and shareholders, we used the percentage of stock ownership by a
CEO. We expect that the larger the percentage of ownership by the CEO,
the more that CEO’s potential to be shareholder-interest oriented.
We also used the percentage of outside directors as another proxy for
the degree of dictatorship by the CEO. Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994)
insist that when the board has a majority of outside directors, the adoption
of a poison pill is good news for shareholders since the poison pill extracts
the highest possible price from the bidder. A limited percentage of outside
directors reduces the political power to increase shareholder interests if there
is a conﬂict between entrenched management and shareholders.
Furthermore, as a proxy for the degree of the threat of takeover, we use
the percentage of stock ownership by foreign investors because they are re-
garded as more active compared with other domestic shareholders. In fact,
Iwatsubo and Tonogi (2006) show that larger ownership by foreign share-
holders increases ﬁrm value in Japan. Here, to create this variable, we ﬁrst
select the ﬁrms if the ownership ratio of foreign investors is more than the
median of the total sample. From these ﬁrms, we allocate a value of one
to ﬁrms with less than 33% ownership by foreign shareholders, or otherwise
zero. Under Japanese Commercial Law, a shareholder who owns more than
33% of all shares in one ﬁrm has veto power over important managerial de-
cisions at shareholder meetings. This means that a shareholder with more
than a 33% shareholding can commit to a managerial decision. This is the
reason why we use 33% as a threshold. Foreign investors with less than 33%
shares are expected to have a higher probability of accepting TOB oﬀerings
from a bidder, because they do not have the power to control decision-making
by the target ﬁrm. In other words, the manager of the potential target ﬁrm
of the hostile TOB might be more threatened by a successful TOB when
13the foreign investor has a larger proportion, but less than 33% of the shares.
Thus, managers are more likely to adopt poison pills to entrench themselves.
To further control the likelihood of being the target of hostile takeover,
we use the net debt to total asset ratio. Net debt is deﬁned as the total
interest-bearing debt minus cash equivalent, and the net debt to total assets is
calculated by dividing the net debt by the total asset. Hence, if this number is
negative, that means the ﬁrm has more cash equivalent than interest bearing
debt. As Xu (2006) shows, the ﬁrm with more internal funds and less growth
opportunity is more likely to be the target of a takeover from an activist
fund, and one-third of ﬁrms that become the target of such activist funds
adopted the antitakeover measure. Therefore, we expect that the CEO of
a ﬁrm with a larger internal fund is more likely to adopt a poison pill to
entrench him/herself or to keep long-term shareholder value.
Data used for making these variables were obtained from Bloomberg
News, QUICK AMSUS, and Toyo-Keizai’s Yakuin Shikiho (Japanese com-
pany board handbook). In terms of the accounting data, for ﬁrms that
adopted pills from April 2005 to March 2006, we used 2004 ﬁscal year data,
and for ﬁrms that adopted pills from April 2006 to May 2006, we used 2005
ﬁscal year data. In terms of corporate governance data, we used 2004 ﬁscal
year data.
4 Control Firms and Descriptive Statistics
4.1 Making control ﬁrms
To evaluate the eﬀect of corporate governance variables on the decision to
adopt poison pills, we used two measures: (1) comparison between the ﬁrms
with poison pills and a set of control ﬁrms, and (2) comparison between the
14ﬁrms with poison pills and other listed ﬁrms on the Tokyo Stock Exchange
(TSE).
For the ﬁrst measure, we constructed two types of control ﬁrms. To make
the ﬁrst control group, each ﬁrm that adopted poison pills was matched with a
nonadopting ﬁrm with a similar PBR and similar market capitalization. The
ﬁrm with the nearest PBR within 70%–130% of the market capitalization
of the ﬁrm was chosen as the control ﬁrm from the overall Japanese non-
pill-adopting ﬁrms listed on the Japanese stock market (called “control ﬁrm
group A”).
The second control group (called “control ﬁrm group B”) is made up
of ﬁrms from the same industry. The industry code is deﬁned by the TSE
with 33 industries. A ﬁrm with the same industry code and the nearest
PBR within 70%–130% of the market capitalization of the sample ﬁrm was
selected.
We used the data from the end of March 2005 to select control ﬁrms
that had adopted poison pills from April 2005 to September 2005. For ﬁrms
adopting poison pills from October 2005 to March 2006, we used the data
from the end of September 2005, and for ﬁrms adopting pills from April 2006
to May 2006, we used the data from the end of March 2006. For the control
ﬁrm group B, 10 ﬁrms were dropped from the sample as there were no proper
matching ﬁrms.
4.2 Descriptive statistics of sample and control ﬁrms
Table 7 shows descriptive statistics for accounting information, valuation
information, board characteristics, and ownership structure of the sample
ﬁrms with poison pills and two control ﬁrms. The table shows that the mean
and median of net debt to total assets for the ﬁrms with poison pills is –5.0%
15and –3.4%, respectively, while that of the non-pill-adopting ﬁrms is –4.9%
and –2.2% for the control ﬁrm group A, and –3.6% and –1.7% for the control
ﬁrm group B. The ﬁrms with poison pills have more cash equivalent on their
balance sheets, and this is consistent with the fact that most of the target
ﬁrms of the activist funds have more cash on their balance sheets (Xu 2006).
Similarly, the average and median equity ratio of the ﬁrms with poison pills
is signiﬁcantly higher than that of the control ﬁrms. The ﬁrms with less
leverage tend to adopt poison pills. In terms of proﬁtability, we ﬁnd no
particular diﬀerence between ﬁrms with poison pills and others.
Regarding the corporate governance variables, the mean and median of
the CEO’s tenure in the pill-adopting ﬁrms is 14.0 and 12.5 years respectively,
which is longer than that of the matching ﬁrms, as the control ﬁrm group A is
12.2 and 10.0 years, and the control ﬁrm group B is 13.4 and 11.0 years. These
diﬀerences are signiﬁcant. The tenure of the CEO in the ﬁrms with poison
pills is signiﬁcantly longer than that of the ﬁrms with no pill. If the CEOs
with longer tenure have more political power in decision-making in the board,
as is supposed in the literature, this result suggests that a weak corporate
governance mechanism increases the possibility of managerial entrenchment
enforced by adoption of poison pills.
The percentage of outside directors does not present a large diﬀerence;
the mean for the pill-adopting sample ﬁrms is 24.7%, while the control ﬁrm
group A is 24.9%, and the control ﬁrm group B is 26.3%. Similarly, we
cannot ﬁnd any remarkable diﬀerence between the ﬁrms with pills and ﬁrms
without pills for other variables. In the next section, we ﬁrst examine the
eﬀect of these corporate governance variables on decisions to adopt poison
pills, and secondly, we investigate the eﬀect of private information revelation
on the stock price through the behavior of adopting a poison pill.
16===Table 7 ====
5 Regression Analysis
5.1 Decision to adopt poison pills
We ﬁrst examine whether the corporate governance factor inﬂuences the
adoption of poison pills using the following speciﬁcation:
POIi = µ0 + µ1 £ (Net debt)i + µ2 £ (Fowner)i + µ3 £ (CEO tenure)i
+µ4 £ (Ratio of outside director)i
+µ5 £ (Share of CEO)i + Ãi (4)
where POIi is a dummy variable that takes the value of unity if the ﬁrm
adopts a poison pill and zero otherwise.
Panel A of Table 8 reports the probit estimates. The ﬁrst column of
results reports the probit estimates for the sample using control ﬁrm group
A, while the second column reports the results for the sample using control
ﬁrm group B. Looking at the result of column 1, the coeﬃcient for foreign
investors is positive and signiﬁcant; ﬁrms with higher foreign stock ownership
are more likely to adopt poison pills. This means that managers feel a larger
threat from the successful TOB if a foreign shareholder has a large block of
shares (more than the median, but not exceeding 33%), and this encourages
managers to adopt poison pills.
===Table 8 ====
The coeﬃcient of CEO tenure is positive and signiﬁcant, which suggests
that a manager with longer tenure tends to adopt pills more often. Because
17managers who are in that position for longer periods tend to have more
power to make independent decisions, this result shows that the tendency
of managers to entrench themselves using poison pills is higher for dictator
type managers.7
The probit models in columns 1 and 2 do not control for the performance
of the sample ﬁrms, but it is highly possible that a ﬁrm with poor performance
has a larger incentive to adopt poison pills because lower stock prices caused
by poor performance make it easier to engage in hostile TOBs. To account
for these possibilities, we split ﬁrms into those for which ROA is higher or
lower than the median of all sample ﬁrms, and perform the same regression.
Column 3 of Table 8 shows the estimation results for the ﬁrms with better
performance, while column 4 of Table 8 shows the results for ﬁrms with poor
performance. Both estimations use control ﬁrm group A as the sample ﬁrms.
Similarly, in column 5, we use ﬁrms with better performance measured by
ROA in the control ﬁrm group B, while in column 6 we show the estimation
results for poorly performing ﬁrms compared with the control ﬁrm group B.
Comparing the results between good ﬁrms and bad ﬁrms in terms of per-
formance, we ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient for CEO tenure is signiﬁcantly positive
only for the ﬁrms with poor performance. Whether we use the control ﬁrm
group A or the control ﬁrm group B, we ﬁnd similar results for CEO tenure.
This provides further evidence that the managers with more power in the
boardroom with longer tenure try to entrench themselves using poison pills.
Especially, when the ﬁrm is performing poorly, the manager feels more pres-
sure to entrench. This result is consistent with the evidence from the U.S.
that managers with longer tenure tend to behave badly from the viewpoint
of shareholder-value maximization(Bebchuck, Grinstein, and Peyer 2006).
7Using larger sample, Takizawa, Tsuru and Hosono (2007) ﬁnds that a ﬁrm with higher
cross-shareholding ratio tends to adopt a poison pill in Japan.
185.2 Conditional event study results
To test the private information revelation hypothesis, we estimate the second-
pass regression of Equation (2). We can write the equation as:




where ¸p denotes the inverse Mills ratio for adopting poison pill announce-
ment P, consistently estimated by using the probit estimates from the equa-
tion for the parameter µ. As Nayak and Prabhala (2001) explain, the equa-
tion is estimated by OLS with standard errors adjusted along the lines of
Heckman (1979). Panel B of Table 8 reports the estimates. Here, we control
for the eﬀect of the announcements about past performance, forecasted fu-
ture performance and some other positive news for stock price, because the
response by the market to this information might oﬀset the eﬀect of poison
pill adoption.
As is shown in panel B of Table 8, the slope of the coeﬃcient ¯p is signif-
icantly negative whichever sample ﬁrm we use. These results are consistent
with the information revelation hypothesis. That is, private information
about a manager’s preference is revealed by adopting a poison pill. There-
fore, the market accepts that information as a negative signal in terms of
corporate governance.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that ¯p is signiﬁcantly negative only in the cases of
ﬁrms with poor performance whether we use control ﬁrm group A or control
ﬁrm group B as a sample. Comparing the results in columns 3 and 4, we
ﬁnd that only ¯p of the regression using the ﬁrms with poor performance is
signiﬁcantly negative. We ﬁnd similar results even if we use control ﬁrm group
19B as a sample. Therefore, the stock price decreases with the announcement
of the poison pill when the ﬁrm is performing poorly, and the stock price
does not respond to the news when a better-performing ﬁrm adopts a poison
pill.
Based on the information revelation hypotheses, we suggest that the mar-
ket accepts the information about adopting a poison pill as a bad signal for
shareholder wealth when the ﬁrm is performing poorly. Market participants
conﬁrm the tendency for managers to entrench themselves against the hostile
TOB using poison pills, especially in ﬁrms with poor performance. On the
other hand, the adoption of poison pills by ﬁrms with better performance
does not cause the investors concern.
We ﬁnd that CEOs with longer tenure tend to introduce poison pills
when the ﬁrm is performing poorly. As we discussed above, information
about corporate governance structure is publicly available, and the market
assesses the seriousness of the conﬂict of interest between a manager and
shareholders by examining this information. Thus, the above results show
that market participants conﬁrm their assessments of corporate governance
by accepting the news that the ﬁrm has adopted a poison pill and adjust
their evaluation of the agency cost, which decreases the stock price when the
ﬁrm’s performance worsens.
5.3 Robustness test
For a robustness test of the above results, we performed the same analysis
using all ﬁrms listed on the stock market. Instead of using control ﬁrms
to estimate the poison pill adoption decision, we used all listed ﬁrms that
have no poison pills as comparable ﬁrms to the ﬁrms with poison pills.8 The
8Because we could not obtain information about CEO tenure and the ratio of CEO
shareholdings, we excluded the sample ﬁrms listed on JASDAQ.
20results are shown in Table 9.
===Table 9 ====
Panel A of Table 9 reports the probit estimates. The ﬁrst column of the
results reports the probit estimates for all sample ﬁrms. Here, we include a
log of total assets to control the size eﬀect. We, in fact, ﬁnd that larger ﬁrms
tend to adopt poison pills because ﬁrms must pay ﬁxed costs for adopting the
pills. The coeﬃcient for foreign investors is again positive and signiﬁcant;
ﬁrms with higher (more than the median, but not exceeding 33%) foreign
stock ownership are more likely to adopt poison pills, which again suggests
that the threat of takeover forces managers to adopt the pills. On the other
hand, the coeﬃcient for the shares of CEOs is signiﬁcantly negative and its
magnitude is relatively large compared with the shares of foreign sharehold-
ers. We have two alternative interpretations for this negative coeﬃcient. One
interpretation is that the agency problems between CEOs and shareholders
become less serious if the CEO has more shares. Another is that the proba-
bility of a hostile TOB is smaller when the CEO has a larger share, and the
CEO does not need the poison pill to obtain bargaining power in the TOB
or to be entrenched against the hostile bid. We ﬁnd the tenure of the CEO
is signiﬁcantly positive even if we use all the listed ﬁrms as the sample.
Then, we divided the sample into two groups based on ROA and per-
formed the same regression in columns 2 and 3. In column 2 of panel A in
Table 9, we show the probit result for the ﬁrms with ROA higher than the
median of the total sample. In column 3, we show the probit result for the
ﬁrms with ROA lower than the median of the total sample. The tenure of
the CEO is signiﬁcantly positive when the ﬁrm is performing poorly. This
is consistent with the results we obtained in Table 8. A CEO with longer
21tenure adopts a poison pill when performance is poor, and not when it is
good. Supposing that the CEO with longer tenure has more power over the
board and can be regarded as being of the dictator type, the purpose of the
adoption of the poison pill is to entrench him/herself.
We ﬁnd that the coeﬃcient of the share of foreign ownership is signiﬁ-
cantly positive when the ﬁrm is performing better. This result shows that
the ﬁrm is more likely to adopt a poison pill when it has foreign block share-
holders, at least when its performance is good. The presence of block share-
holdings by foreign investors drives Japanese managers to adopt poison pills
because they feel more threatened by the market for corporate control. Fur-
thermore, we again ﬁnd that the eﬀect of shares held by the CEO is signiﬁ-
cantly negative in both regressions.
We performed the same OLS regression to examine the hypothesis that
the market responds to the announcement of poison pills because their adop-
tion reveals the managerial tendency for entrenchment, and panel B of Table
9 reports the estimates. First, we again ﬁnd the announcement of the past
performance or performance projection signiﬁcantly aﬀects the CAR.
Then, we ﬁnd a negative and signiﬁcant result in the coeﬃcient of ¯p
when we use the entire sample. Looking at the results in columns 2 and 3,
we ﬁnd again that the coeﬃcient of ¯p is signiﬁcantly negative only when the
ﬁrm is performing poorly. This is the same result as when we use control
ﬁrms for the ﬁrst-stage probit analysis. These results suggest that the stock
price declines in response to the announcement of the poison pill only when
the ﬁrm’s performance is poor. The poison pills for the ﬁrms with poor
performance then have a negative wealth eﬀect for the shareholders.
In the above probit model, we ﬁnd that CEOs with longer tenure tend to
adopt poison pills only when the ﬁrm is performing poorly. Combining these
22two results in panel A and panel B again suggests that investors in the stock
market fully conﬁrm their expectation that a manager with longer tenure
has a stronger tendency to entrench him/herself by observing the fact that
he/she has introduced the poison pill when the ﬁrm’s performance is poor.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented evidence using Japanese cases that the adoption of poi-
son pills itself reveals private information about the preferences for manage-
rial entrenchment to the stock market. We ﬁnd that this private information
revelation eﬀect is the reason for stock price declines upon the announcement
of pill defenses, especially when ﬁrms are performing poorly. Based on the
fact that a ﬁrm has adopted a poison pill, the stock market conﬁrms that
the manager wants to entrench him/herself.
We also ﬁnd that the tenure of the CEO plays a key role in the adoption of
poison pills. Especially, we ﬁnd that a CEO with longer tenure is more likely
to adopt a poison pill when there is a threat of a takeover and the performance
of the ﬁrm is poor. These results are consistent with the prediction that the
CEO has more power to control the board if he/she is in that position for
a longer period. The adoption of a poison pill by the CEO with longer
tenure and poor performance should be treated as a negative signal from the
viewpoint of the shareholders’ value maximization.
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25Total 2005 2006
Prior warning type 158 21 137
With shareholders approval 84 4 80
Without shareholders approval 74 17 57
Rights plan type 14 7 7
With shareholders approval 13 6 7
Without shareholders approval 1 1 0
Total types 171 27 144
With shareholders approval 96 9 87
Without shareholders approval 75 18 57
Table 1 Takeover defense measures of 171 cases adopted from April 2005
to May 2006 classified by type, year, and shareholder approval
Year
 The prior warning type is a rule that must be followed by a party pursuing a takeover,
and breach of the rule by the acquirers leads to the actual measures, such as the
issuance of new stock reservation rights. The rights plan type involves the actual
issuance of new stock reservation rights. These rights are issued in advance to trust
banks or special purpose corporations, and if the takeover event occurs they will be


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1 Fish, Agriculture & Forestry 11 0.3% 1 0.7%
2 Mining 7 0.2% 0.0%
3 Construction 220 5.7% 2 1.3%
4 Foods 156 4.0% 9 5.9%
5 Textiles & Apparels 82 2.1% 5 3.3%
6 Pulp & Paper 29 0.7% 0.0%
7 Chemicals 219 5.6% 14 9.2%
8 Pharmaceutical 52 1.3% 4 2.6%
9 Oil & Coal Products 14 0.4% 0.0%
10 Rubber Products 21 0.5% 0.0%
11 Glass & Ceramics Products 75 1.9% 2 1.3%
12 Iron & Steel 56 1.4% 7 4.6%
13 Nonferrous Metals 42 1.1% 3 2.0%
14 Metal Products 100 2.6% 5 3.3%
15 Machinery 247 6.4% 11 7.2%
16 Electric Appliances 308 7.9% 13 8.5%
17 Transportation Equipment 106 2.7% 5 3.3%
18 Precision Instruments 52 1.3% 4 2.6%
19 Other Products 117 3.0% 10 6.5%
20 Electric Power & Gas 25 0.6% 1 0.7%
21 Land Transportation 66 1.7% 9 5.9%
22 Marine Transportation 18 0.5% 2 1.3%
23 Air Transportation 6 0.2% 0.0%
24 Warehousing & Harbor Transportation Services 43 1.1% 1 0.7%
25 Information & Communication 346 8.9% 16 10.5%
26 Wholesale Trade 392 10.1% 8 5.2%
27 Retail Trade 382 9.8% 8 5.2%
28 Banks 98 2.5% 0.0%
29 Securities & Commodity Futures 40 1.0% 1 0.7%
30 Insurance 10 0.3% 0.0%
31 Other Financing Business 59 1.5% 0.0%
32 Real Estate 127 3.3% 1 0.7%
33 Services 355 9.1% 11 7.2%
Total 3,881 100.0% 153 100.0%








































































































































































































































































































1Table 6 Abnormal returns at announcement of adoption of poison pills from April 2005 to May 2006
Number
of cases
Mean Median  
AR
All firms 167 -0.11% -0.31%
Clean sample 51 -0.80% ** -0.51% **
CAR
All firms 167 -0.22% -0.24%
Clean sample 52 -1.50% ** -1.25% ***
 
We used the standard market model with TOPIX as a market index. AR denotes the mean abnormal stock
return for one-day interval from the close of the announcement date to the close of trading on the first date.
CAR denotes the mean cumulative two-day abnormal stock return from the close of the announcement date to
the close of the trading on the second date. Clean sample is a sample of firms announced pill adoptions without
confounding news events. ***, **, and * denote a significant difference from zero at 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively.T
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